At the beginning of January, Dr. Li Wenliang had just been reprimanded by the hospital's relevant department, and the original plan was for him to be dismissed from the hospital. A department head at our hospital advised us not to go against the leadership, not to wear masks, and not to speak out, otherwise, you would be dismissed like Li Wenliang...
8000 words | 10 minutes reading
Source | Global Times
The day before yesterday (March 16), the Global Times published an article written by its special correspondent Fan Wei in Wuhan titled "Medical Staff at Wuhan Central Hospital Speak Out: The Epidemic is a Mirror to Reveal the Truth," which vividly exposed the various petty and dirty matters revealed during the epidemic prevention and control period at Wuhan Central Hospital, where "whistleblower" Ai Fen and "whistleblower" Li Wenliang worked. It portrayed the situation in a profound way, truly reflecting:
Great love and beauty, with frontline medical staff fighting desperately
Ugly and vile, with second-line leaders giving blind commands
Unfortunately, shortly after the article was published, it was deleted. Subsequently, various self-media outlets reposted it, only to be widely deleted across the internet again...
What a familiar rhythm, what a familiar scene: What is this all about? Honestly, I don't understand, let's just read the article!
Medical Staff at Wuhan Central Hospital Speak Out: The Epidemic is a Mirror to Reveal the Truth
"Many medical staff around me have had thoughts of resigning and changing careers after the epidemic ends," said Liu Jie, a doctor at Wuhan Central Hospital, to the Global Times' special correspondent in Wuhan. "This epidemic has overturned many people's views on life and work. The lost colleagues, the helpless patients, and the compassionate hearts of medical workers have been repeatedly doused by reality. For medical staff, it seems there is nothing more despairing than this."
"But we ultimately persevered. We have experienced the warmth and coldness of the world and witnessed the revival of the city. Some loves can only be deeply understood after enduring the darkness and seeing the dawn," Liu Jie said.
"I told myself, the disaster from 17 years ago is coming back"
Published academic papers show that the first confirmed case of the novel coronavirus pneumonia in Wuhan occurred on December 1 last year. According to public reports, Zhang Jixian, head of the Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine Department at Hubei Provincial Hospital of Traditional Chinese and Western Medicine, is believed to be the first person to report the epidemic. On February 6, a special correspondent from the Global Times interviewed Director Zhang, who told the reporter that on December 27 last year, she and the hospital had reported the abnormal conditions of four patients to the Jianghan District CDC. On December 29, the provincial and municipal health commissions instructed the Wuhan CDC, Jinyintan Hospital, and Jianghan District CDC to come to Hubei Provincial Hospital of Traditional Chinese and Western Medicine to begin an epidemiological investigation.
However, during the nearly month-long period between the appearance of the first patient and the initial response from the provincial and municipal CDCs, Wuhan Central Hospital was not calm. As one of the two top-tier hospitals closest to the Huanan Seafood Market (the other being Hubei Provincial Hospital of Traditional Chinese and Western Medicine), Wuhan Central Hospital became one of the first hospitals to "engage" with the novel coronavirus.
Ai Fen, head of the emergency department at Wuhan Central Hospital, stated in a media interview that on December 16, 2019, the emergency department at the Nanjing Road campus of Wuhan Central Hospital received a patient who worked at the Huanan Seafood Market and had a persistent high fever. On the 22nd, this patient was transferred to the respiratory department, where a fiberoptic bronchoscopy was performed to obtain bronchoalveolar lavage fluid, and the sample was sent to a third-party testing agency for high-throughput sequencing. Later, the testing agency verbally informed the central hospital that this was a coronavirus.
A staff member from the Shanghai Fudan University Affiliated Public Health Clinical Center also revealed a case to our reporter: on December 26, 2019, Wuhan Central Hospital admitted a patient with a history of contact with the Huanan Seafood Market and pneumonia of unknown origin.
Zhao Su, the leading expert in the respiratory department, believed that this patient's infection symptoms were quite unique. Based on the research project design, Wuhan Central Hospital collected the patient's respiratory samples, which were transferred to a team at the Shanghai Public Health Clinical Center by the Wuhan CDC on the afternoon of January 3, 2020.
Dr. Tao Jun, who has been practicing medicine for over 20 years at Wuhan Central Hospital, stated that the hospital's Houhu campus admitted four suspected patients with a history of contact with the Huanan Seafood Market on December 28 and 29, 2019. Among them, three were merchants from the Huanan Seafood City, and one was a family member of a merchant from the Huanan Seafood Market. The four patients all exhibited characteristics of lymphocytopenia in blood tests, ground-glass opacities in lung CT scans, and fever symptoms, which were significantly different from typical community-acquired pneumonia.
Tao Jun believed that these suspected patients at Wuhan Central Hospital in mid to late December were signs that the novel coronavirus pneumonia virus was already rampant. "The basic reproduction number R0 of the novel coronavirus pneumonia is still around 3.0, which is close to the early situation of SARS, and even slightly lower than the judgment of the early transmission ability of SARS in some research reports. According to the trend of infectious diseases, if the first patient only appeared at the end of December, the development speed would certainly not be as rapid as it is now," Tao Jun said.
However, Tao Jun also admitted that even though some patients with low fever, fatigue, and ground-glass opacities in CT images appeared at Wuhan Central Hospital in mid to late December, he did not realize the severity of the situation due to the atypical symptoms. He and his colleagues only began to be alert to this abnormal situation at the end of December.
A document confirmed by doctors at Wuhan Central Hospital, titled "Wuhan Central Hospital's Response to the COVID-19 Epidemic," shows that around 2:30 PM on December 29, the doctors in the emergency department of the Houhu campus reported four patients from the Huanan Seafood Market to the hospital's public health department. After CT scans and blood tests, these four patients exhibited signs of viral pneumonia.
Subsequently, the public health department reported this situation to the Jianghan District CDC's transmission prevention department, which replied that the district had also received reports from other places recently, and after sending samples to the city for testing, no results were found. Regarding the situation at Wuhan Central Hospital, the Jianghan District CDC's transmission prevention department would report to the leadership and provide a response later.
Afterward, the medical department of Wuhan Central Hospital organized an expert consultation. After the respiratory department experts consulted with the emergency department, they communicated and found that there were also two patients from the Huanan Seafood Market in the respiratory department, bringing the total number of pneumonia patients of unknown origin at Wuhan Central Hospital to six. Around 8 PM that evening, the Jianghan District CDC and Wuhan Emergency Office arrived at Wuhan Central Hospital's Houhu campus to conduct epidemiological investigations and sampling for the seven patients, which were sent overnight to the Wuhan CDC.
On the afternoon of December 30, the high-throughput sequencing results of one patient's bronchoalveolar lavage fluid were returned to Wuhan Central Hospital, indicating that the patient was highly suspected of having SARS. This news spread throughout Wuhan Central Hospital. "Later that afternoon, I saw a doctor in the emergency department wearing a mask I had never seen before, and later I learned that it was an N95 mask. When I learned the test results, I told myself that the disaster from 17 years ago is coming back," Tao Jun said.
From "cautiously reporting" to "trying not to report"
By January, the number of suspected patients admitted to Wuhan Central Hospital increased geometrically, but the true situation became harder for the outside world to know.
According to the "Wuhan Central Hospital's Response to the COVID-19 Epidemic," on January 3, doctors from the public health department of Wuhan Central Hospital called the Jianghan District CDC to inquire about the handling of the previously reported seven cases of viral pneumonia. The response was that for such infectious diseases, reports could only be made after receiving instructions from higher authorities, and specific reporting of diseases would wait for further notice. After several rounds of "pushing back," from January 8 to January 10, Wuhan Central Hospital finally succeeded in reporting 14 cases of pneumonia of unknown origin.
On January 13, leaders from the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission's CDC and the Jianghan District Health Commission's CDC came to Wuhan Central Hospital's Nanjing Road campus to convey the latest spirit of reporting cases of pneumonia of unknown origin. At that time, the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission's CDC required that cases of pneumonia of unknown origin be reported cautiously. The discovered cases of viral pneumonia had to complete various tests and related examinations within the hospital. After being diagnosed as pneumonia of unknown origin by the hospital's expert group, they could then report to the district health commission for consultation and notify the district CDC for sampling. After being tested at the district, city, and provincial levels, if they still remained as pneumonia of unknown origin, they could only report case information after obtaining approval from the provincial health commission.
However, according to Dr. Lu Yi from Wuhan Central Hospital, this requirement for "cautious reporting" evolved into "trying not to report" at Wuhan Central Hospital.
Lu Yi stated that in early January, the diagnostic criteria for pneumonia of unknown origin issued to doctors required the following three conditions to be met:
First, the patient must have a history of living and working at the Huanan Seafood Market or close contact with merchants from the Huanan Seafood Market.
Second, the patient's CT must show typical ground-glass opacities in the lungs.
Third, upper respiratory tract swabs must exclude eight pathogens: influenza A, influenza B, respiratory syncytial virus, adenovirus, mycoplasma, chlamydia, etc.
If all three conditions were met, along with symptoms of cough, sputum, and low fever, the case of pneumonia of unknown origin needed to be reported.
However, in practice, doctors at Wuhan Central Hospital received special requirements from the hospital.
According to Dr. Tian Xu from Wuhan Central Hospital, in early January, the hospital suddenly halted virus testing for patients with pneumonia of unknown origin. The hospital received instructions from relevant departments that when patients with fever and cough symptoms came to the hospital and the cause was unclear, they were not allowed to perform bronchoalveolar lavage or send relevant samples for third-party testing for metagenomic sequencing.
By early January, the number of suspected patients visiting Wuhan Central Hospital had significantly increased. For example, in the internal medicine emergency department of the Houhu campus, the daily number of patients previously ranged from 200 to 300, but during that time, the number of patients suddenly doubled. Faced with a large influx of suspected patients, the hospital did not allow doctors to report patients as "pneumonia of unknown origin" in the infectious disease reporting system, and even diagnosing patients as "viral pneumonia" was not allowed; they could only be diagnosed as "pulmonary infection," making it impossible to report the true situation of a large number of pneumonia patients of unknown origin.
By late January, a large number of patients flooded into Wuhan Central Hospital, with the daily outpatient volume being three to four times the usual. The hospital again required that only hospitalized patients could be reported, while suspected patients found in outpatient settings were not to be reported at all. Those who could not be hospitalized could only return home to isolate and take medication according to medical advice, making it impossible to even count how many COVID-19 patients Wuhan Central Hospital had treated.
"In mid-January, there were times when the number of suspected patients found in one department in a single day exceeded the data published by the Wuhan Municipal Health Commission. These suspected patients could not be included in the real data, but that does not mean they did not exist or that they were not infectious," Lu Yi said.
"The Warriors Who Shed Their Armor"
The large number of reported patients could not be reflected in real data, nor did they receive the attention of the leadership at Wuhan Central Hospital. The hospital leadership continuously issued notices prohibiting doctors from discussing the epidemic privately, forbidding doctors from revealing the objective fact of human-to-human transmission of the novel coronavirus to the outside world, and not allowing doctors to "alarmist" and disclose the hospital's true situation without permission, emphasizing the need for discipline and organization. However, many doctors on the front lines who intuitively felt the severity of the situation repeatedly requested the hospital leadership to carry out preventive work and issue internal warnings, but the hospital took no measures.
"I remember on December 30, the news about our hospital confirming a case of coronavirus was already spreading widely. Some of our colleagues took this news to inquire with the relevant departments of the hospital whether it was true, and the response was that it was purely a rumor. The relevant departments of the hospital even asked us to help refute the rumor, but we all knew that this rumor could not be refuted. On December 29, we had already reported the situation of pneumonia patients of unknown origin to the district CDC, and on December 30, the high-throughput sequencing results of the bronchoalveolar lavage fluid of the patients we sent for testing also returned to the hospital, indicating a high suspicion of SARS. The hospital should have taken action to raise the awareness of protection among doctors, but instead, they concealed the truth from us and even forbade us from self-protection, which made us very heartbroken," Tian Xu said.
According to a doctor from Wuhan Central Hospital, medical staff in the emergency department, respiratory department, and ICU usually wear medical masks to work, but after the outbreak, the medical staff in these three departments requested to wear N95 masks. After consideration, the hospital leadership agreed to the request of these three departments but simultaneously required medical staff in other departments not to wear masks while working.
This regulation from the hospital leadership sparked strong dissatisfaction among many doctors. Without support from the hospital, many doctors could only pay out of their own pockets to buy masks. However, on January 3, during a weekly meeting at Wuhan Central Hospital, the hospital leadership criticized several department heads for wearing masks. "At the beginning of January, Dr. Li Wenliang had just been reprimanded by the hospital's relevant department, and the original plan was for him to be dismissed. A department head at our hospital advised us not to go against the leadership, not to wear masks, and not to speak out, otherwise, you would be dismissed like Li Wenliang," said Dr. Zhao Chen from Wuhan Central Hospital.
The rule prohibiting doctors from wearing masks, which left many doctors puzzled, laid the groundwork for the subsequent infection of a large number of medical staff at Wuhan Central Hospital.
According to Zhao Chen, during the peak of the outbreak, a large number of patients panic-stricken flooded into various departments of the hospital, and suspected infected patients or those in the incubation period could be encountered in any department. The virus does not discriminate by department; it only targets those without protection. At Wuhan Central Hospital, those departments where wearing masks was not allowed, such as thyroid, breast surgery, cardiac surgery, ophthalmology, ENT, and ultrasound, saw a large number of doctors fall ill in January.
Among the doctors who have died at Wuhan Central Hospital, Li Wenliang, Mei Zhongming, and Zhu Heping were ophthalmologists, while Jiang Xueqing was a thyroid and breast surgeon. Additionally, the vice president of the hospital, Wang Ping, the head of the ethics committee, Liu Li, the deputy chief physician of thoracic surgery, Yi Fan, and the deputy chief physician of urology, Hu Weifeng, are all in critical condition.
"Doctors Li Wenliang and Mei Zhongming were both infected by an 82-year-old glaucoma patient in early January. Both doctors treated this patient without being allowed to wear masks. After being infected, they both exhibited symptoms such as cough, low fever, and fatigue. After their conditions were reported to the hospital, despite knowing that both had been infected with the virus, the hospital did not arrange for them to be transferred to the infectious disease department for hospitalization in a timely manner, but instead allowed them to stay in the ophthalmology ward, and did not provide any protective measures for the ophthalmology doctors, yet they still had to work as usual," said Dr. Zhang Ting from Wuhan Central Hospital.
In addition to the masks that were "required to be removed against the current," doctors at Wuhan Central Hospital also lost protective suits that had been raised through donations due to the insistence of the hospital's relevant departments.
Throughout January, doctors at Wuhan Central Hospital fought various battles with the hospital leadership and relevant departments over protective suits.
In mid-January, the hospital leadership prohibited frontline medical staff from wearing protective suits and face shields while treating patients. "After a department head was reprimanded by the hospital leadership for wearing a mask during a meeting, some doctors in our emergency department could only secretly protect themselves. I remember we wore our privately prepared protective suits or isolation gowns under our white coats, fortunately, the leadership did not conduct clinical rounds, so we managed to 'get away with it,'" Tian Xu said.
Later, as the epidemic developed, protective suits became standard equipment for frontline medical workers, but Wuhan Central Hospital could not provide enough protective suits for them. During the days of severe shortages of protective materials, raincoats and garbage bags served as substitutes for protective suits. "In early February, doctors from various departments formed a group to discuss using raincoats as substitutes for protective suits. We had serious discussions and debates about whether raincoats could prevent splashes, their airtightness, and the number of times they could be disinfected and reused, but ultimately this plan was not widely adopted. During that time, everyone wore various things until factories in other regions resumed operations, and the large-scale aid from medical teams across the country alleviated these difficulties," Tian Xu said.
However, what saddened the doctors at Wuhan Central Hospital the most was that on one hand, the hospital could not provide sufficient protective materials for frontline medical staff, and on the other hand, it refused to accept protective materials that frontline doctors had publicly raised. Many donated protective materials were rejected by the hospital as soon as they arrived.
"In early February, we were already at our wits' end. Clinical frontline doctors had no protective suits, let alone ordinary surgical masks. At that time, one of our colleagues brought in a batch of protective materials donated by the German Chamber of Commerce, but the hospital leadership refused to accept them on the grounds that they did not meet the requirements of the Red Cross. After unsuccessful communication, most of these materials were transferred to Wuhan Fourth Hospital and Wuhan Union Hospital with the coordination of the Huazhong University Alumni Association, and they happily accepted them, while our hearts were bleeding," Tian Xu said.
In the face of the epidemic, ignoring the protective needs of frontline medical staff led to the direct consequence of a large number of infections among medical staff. According to public reports, over 200 medical staff at Wuhan Central Hospital were infected, ranking among the highest in Wuhan's major hospitals. "It should be said that a large number of medical staff at our hospital were infected, which is both normal and abnormal. The normal aspect is that our hospital is located near the Huanan Seafood Market, and we were among the first to encounter the novel coronavirus. The abnormal aspect is that our hospital had long discovered the fact of human-to-human transmission, yet the hospital leadership continued to conceal the truth from us and even prevented us from self-protection. Hubei Provincial Hospital of Traditional Chinese and Western Medicine is also near the Huanan Seafood Market, and they were also among the first hospitals to 'engage' with the novel coronavirus. Wuhan Traditional Chinese Medicine Hospital is only a few hundred meters away from our Nanjing Road campus, and they faced the same situation as us. They also had medical staff infected, but their overall situation was much better, which speaks volumes," Zhao Chen said.
"The Obstructed Comfort"
In addition to the protective materials donated from across the country and even globally to major hospitals in Wuhan, various sectors of society provided various forms of support and guarantees for medical staff fighting on the front lines against the epidemic. Among them, the China Red Cross Foundation, under the China Red Cross Society, provided a humanitarian relief fund for medical workers on the front lines of epidemic prevention and control, with beneficiaries including but not limited to frontline medical workers who were confirmed infected and those who died in the line of duty.
According to the funding standards provided on the China Red Cross Foundation's official website, for frontline medical workers who unfortunately confirmed infection while fighting against the COVID-19 epidemic and meet the funding conditions after review, the fund will provide 100,000 yuan per person; for frontline medical workers who unfortunately died in the line of duty while fighting against the COVID-19 epidemic and meet the funding standards after review, the fund will provide 1 million yuan per family.
This officially established relief fund has a simple and efficient application, review, and disbursement process. Since it fully opened to accept applications for hospital and individual funding on January 26, by March 14, the fund had provided humanitarian assistance to 2,322 medical workers (a total of 2,324 instances) fighting against the epidemic in 48 batches. Among them, 2,294 were medical workers who unfortunately contracted the virus while fighting the epidemic; 28 were medical workers who unfortunately died in the line of duty while fighting the epidemic. Applicants included medical workers from major hospitals in Wuhan, such as Wuhan Union Hospital, Tongji Hospital, Wuhan University Zhongnan Hospital, Hubei Provincial People's Hospital, and Hubei Provincial Hospital of Traditional Chinese and Western Medicine.
According to the official application process for funding, frontline medical workers who unfortunately contracted the virus or the direct relatives of those who unfortunately died in the line of duty can submit a "Self-Application Form for Medical Humanitarian Relief Fund" after having their situation confirmed by the hospital where they work or the hospital providing epidemic prevention services, along with valid proof materials such as personal identification, confirmed medical diagnosis, and death certificates.
However, such a public welfare activity to compensate medical workers fighting against the epidemic faced numerous obstacles at Wuhan Central Hospital.
According to the results publicly disclosed on the China Red Cross Foundation's official website, it was not until February 7, 2020, that the first Wuhan Central Hospital medical staff appeared on the list of beneficiaries in the eleventh batch. The beneficiary was Dr. Li Wenliang, an ophthalmologist who unfortunately died. Then, on February 12, the name of a Wuhan Central Hospital medical staff member appeared for the second time in the seventeenth batch of beneficiaries.
However, by that time, a large number of infected medical staff had begun to apply for assistance from the China Red Cross Foundation, but the results were stuck on a piece of official seal from Wuhan Central Hospital. Many infected medical staff who met the application standards were unable to get the hospital to stamp their application forms confirming their situation.
"I jokingly referred to myself as the 'virus king' of the hospital," said Dr. Li Zhe from Wuhan Central Hospital. "Unlike other infected doctors who had severe symptoms but tested negative multiple times, I had mild symptoms but tested positive multiple times. I was infected in early February and applied for assistance from the Red Cross Foundation in mid-February, but the hospital refused to stamp my application form at that time because a large number of infected medical staff were applying for this assistance. The hospital leadership saw this situation and told us that with so many medical staff applying for assistance, if it got out that so many employees at the Central Hospital were infected, it would affect their reputation."
Later, those infected medical staff who were obstructed by a piece of official seal from Wuhan Central Hospital began to report the situation to the China Red Cross Society. "After the matter reached the Red Cross Society, they contacted our hospital to inquire why the hospital was unwilling to stamp the applications of these infected medical staff. Under external pressure, the hospital finally agreed to stamp the applications for those infected medical staff who tested positive for the virus in late February. I clearly remember that my stamp was finally applied on March 1," Li Zhe said.
According to the results publicly disclosed on the China Red Cross Foundation's official website, it was not until February 25, when the thirtieth batch of beneficiaries was announced, that more than ten infected medical staff from Wuhan Central Hospital appeared on the list. On February 28, the thirty-third batch of beneficiaries saw 46 infected medical staff from Wuhan Central Hospital appear at once. Subsequently, nearly every batch of publicized lists included medical staff from Wuhan Central Hospital. This transparent public list confirms the tortuous assistance journey of the infected medical staff at Wuhan Central Hospital.
Also on March 1, Jiang Xueqing, the party branch secretary and director of the thyroid and breast surgery department at Wuhan Central Hospital, died after ineffective treatment for COVID-19. Zhou Zhixiang, a staff member of the China Red Cross Foundation, shared this news on social media, commenting, "Rest in peace, Dr. Jiang! Again, it's from Wuhan Central Hospital, which has the highest number of infected medical staff and the most applications for assistance. Many things need to be reflected upon; otherwise, the cost will be too high, and medical staff will be heartbroken."
According to statistics compiled by our reporter based on the results publicly disclosed on the China Red Cross Foundation's official website, by the time the forty-eighth batch of beneficiaries was announced on March 14, 231 infected medical staff from Wuhan Central Hospital had received assistance from the China Red Cross Foundation. However, doctors from Wuhan Central Hospital told our reporter that this was not the complete number of infected medical staff from their hospital.
"I comfort myself that this epidemic may be a good thing"
Currently, the epidemic prevention and control work in Wuhan has achieved phased victories, with the closure of 16 makeshift hospitals and the discharge of a large number of patients indicating that the COVID-19 epidemic, which ravaged Wuhan for more than three months, has stabilized. However, when talking about the dark moments experienced by Wuhan Central Hospital, Dr. Liu Jie from Wuhan Central Hospital expressed that many things are hard to look back on.
"For doctors, the most helpless thing is not being able to save their own family members," Liu Jie said. In addition to a large number of infected medical staff, there were also many cases of family members of medical staff being infected. Many doctors fought against COVID-19 on the front lines while also searching for hospital beds for their infected family members, oscillating daily between saving lives and feeling helpless.
"We have a colleague in the ultrasound department who has been fighting on the front lines against the epidemic, but her father-in-law, grandfather, grandmother, and uncle were all unfortunately infected with COVID-19. When her family members were critically ill, she called 120 for help, but the hospital had no beds available, and 120 could not come to pick up the patients. When she sought help from Wuhan Central Hospital, the hospital informed her that they could only register in advance, as over 100 infected family members of medical staff were already waiting to be hospitalized. In the absence of effective treatment, her grandmother, father-in-law, and grandfather passed away one after another in the three weeks before February. An epidemic destroyed a family, yet after repeatedly wiping her tears, she had to continue returning to the battlefield against the epidemic. I couldn't even find the words to comfort her; just looking at her social media made me cry. I have great respect for her, but this respect can only remain in my heart," Liu Jie said.
Reflecting on her experiences during the Wuhan COVID-19 epidemic, Liu Jie stated that too many patients deteriorated and even died while waiting for a hospital bed. She could see patients but could not provide them with effective treatment, and this time she felt an unprecedented sense of powerlessness.
"If it weren't for the timely and efficient guidance from the central government to help Wuhan with epidemic prevention and control, the losses in Wuhan would have been even more severe," Liu Jie said. In her view, many patients who originally had nowhere to seek medical help, especially the elderly and those with underlying health conditions, were able to receive hospitalization opportunities due to the establishment of Huoshenshan Hospital, Leishenshan Hospital, makeshift hospitals, and various designated hospitals.
"In February, when medical teams from Gansu, Chongqing, Heilongjiang, and Shaanxi successively arrived at Central Hospital, we finally welcomed a turning point." Speaking of this process from disorder to order, from scarcity to abundance, Liu Jie believes that behind it is the central government's determination and action to spare no effort in treating patients.
"The epidemic has brought us infinite pain and endless reflection. Sometimes I think this epidemic may also be a good thing; it has exposed those who are full of bureaucratic and formalistic tendencies. I must say, the epidemic is a mirror to reveal the truth!" Liu Jie said.
(The names Liu Jie, Tao Jun, Lu Yi, Tian Xu, Zhao Chen, Zhang Ting, Li Zhe, and Zhou Zhixiang in the text are all pseudonyms.)