Editor’s Note: The original article from this public account has been deleted.
Original by Lai Jie, Selected Highlights
We have sorted and compared a large number of information sources to analyze the most critical information in major events.
Looking at hot topics, focusing on key points.
Follow the “Selected Highlights” public account for the article “Media Fried Chicken.”
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the question of whose fault it is has been one of the public's most concerned issues.
On February 26, Caijing magazine published one of the most significant reports on this topic to date. They interviewed a member of the second group of experts from the National Health Commission who went to Wuhan, who wished to remain anonymous. The article, thousands of words long, conveys one core message—our expert group from Beijing was misled; the local authorities concealed human-to-human transmission; the blame is not ours. News should be viewed comparatively, and information should be analyzed comparatively to better grasp the key points.
Regarding the topic of “shifting blame,” I will provide a detailed overview today.
First Round
Mayor Zhou Kicks Off
On January 27, Wuhan Mayor Zhou Xianwang's remarks during an interview with CCTV were widely interpreted as shifting blame upward—“I reported it, but I don’t have the authority to disclose it.” The mainstream legal view holds that the responsibility for disclosing the epidemic lies with the National Health Commission. His original words were:
“Delayed disclosure, this point everyone should understand, because it is an infectious disease, and there is an Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Law that mandates disclosure. As a local government, I can only disclose it after I receive authorization. This was not understood by many at the time. Later, especially on January 20, the State Council held an executive meeting, classifying this disease as a Class B infectious disease and managing it as a Class A infectious disease, and requiring local responsibility. From that point on, we believed our work became more proactive.”
Analysis:
A key point in this statement is when he received this information. Was it in early January or after mid-January? What exactly did he report? The nuances are worth pondering.
Second Round
Zeng Guang’s Response
On January 30, Zeng Guang, chief epidemiologist at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, responded during an interview with Hu Xijin. One part of the dialogue can be seen as a response.
Zeng stated that Wuhan's slow response to the epidemic was mainly due to a lack of scientific understanding, but he did not rule out some hesitation in decision-making and self-confidence. Public health officials consider scientific issues in their decision-making, which is a scientific perspective, but government officials do not consider issues solely from a scientific perspective; this is just part of their decision-making basis.
“He has to consider political perspectives, stability maintenance issues, economic issues, and whether the public is satisfied with the family reunion during the Spring Festival. What we say is often just a part of what they adopt in their decision-making.”
Analysis:
This statement actually points out several facts: first, it acknowledges that their understanding also has a process, with scientific reasons being the main cause; second, decisions are made by officials, not by us experts; third, scientific considerations are only one aspect of decision-making; fourth, it candidly states that local officials hesitated due to stability maintenance and other considerations.
However, friends with social survival experience know that the focus of a person's commentary is sometimes not on what they primarily say but on what they say after a shift in tone.
Third Round
Secretary Ma’s “Guilt”
On January 31, former Wuhan Party Secretary Ma Guoqiang admitted during a CCTV interview that control measures were implemented late. His original words were:
“I now have a sense of guilt and self-blame. If strict control measures had been taken earlier, the outcome would have been better, and the impact on various parts of the country would have been smaller, which would have spared the Central Committee and the State Council some worry.”
In this interview, he also mentioned two time points:
First, on December 30 and 31, Wuhan reported the situation to the National Health Commission.
Second, on January 12 and 13, after Thailand reported its first case, Wuhan implemented measures such as temperature checks at the airport and high-speed rail stations.
Analysis:
Admitting that control measures were late does not equate to confirming that there was concealment. Reading through this interview, Ma Guoqiang's core message is—“I did not act decisively.” However, even the dock control measures initiated on the 14th were found by many media outlets to be insufficiently strict.
Moreover, the claim that Wuhan reported on December 30 and 31 contradicts some information, such as economist Hua Sheng mentioning that the director of the Chinese CDC noticed the epidemic while surfing the internet on the night of December 30 and subsequently reported it to the leaders of the Health Commission. Another piece of information can also be compared: on January 22, Li Bin, deputy director of the National Health Commission, stated at a press conference that on December 30, 2019, the National Health Commission learned that Wuhan City, Hubei Province, had experienced a cluster of unexplained viral pneumonia cases and immediately dispatched a national working group and expert team. The wording here is—“the National Health Commission learned.” It does not clarify whether it was proactive or reactive.
Furthermore, “reporting the situation” does not equate to reporting human-to-human transmission.
Fourth Round
Current and Former Directors
Starting January 30, as the epidemic data surged, the media began to question whether another system for infectious disease prevention and control—the direct reporting system established after SARS—was functioning. However, two completely different statements emerged.
Yang Gonghuan, former deputy director of the Chinese CDC, stated that the CDC has a dedicated monitoring system that writes analysis reports daily, and it is not a hierarchical reporting system. When hospitals click to report cases in the network system, the CDC should be able to receive them. Current deputy director Feng Zijian, however, stated that the novel coronavirus was not listed as a legally infectious disease at that time, so the two-hour direct reporting system to the national level could not be used. Adjusting the network reporting system settings and training personnel takes time. In response to news of some medical personnel being infected on January 16, he said he was not particularly clear whether the CDC received the information, adding that there are many levels of data reporting, including national, provincial, municipal, and district levels. “Data reporting has a process, and I do not have detailed knowledge of this process.”
Analysis:
From the information disclosed by the media afterward, it appears that Wuhan imposed many restrictions on hospitals reporting cases, so regardless of whether this system was operational, its most basic link may have failed. Additionally, local CDCs are accountable to local health commissions and governments, rather than being managed vertically like customs, which may need to be streamlined.
Fifth Round
Wang Guangfa Protests His Innocence
On February 2, Wang Guangfa, director of the Department of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine at Peking University First Hospital, who was caught in the whirlpool of public opinion, responded to the doubts raised by his “controllable and preventable” theory on January 10.
The core message is twofold: first, the information we received was limited; second, the judgment was not something I could make alone.
Wang Guangfa stated that the information we had was quite limited. From the limited information, we did not see clear evidence of human-to-human transmission. At that time, we were given information about 41 confirmed cases, among which there were two clustered cases. We consulted CDC experts, but could not conclude “human-to-human transmission.” This requires epidemiologists to answer. At that time, we indeed had no evidence; it was not an individual judgment of the epidemic but a collective assessment. However, the assessment data must be reliable. The original data was lacking, and some information was not even obtained, leading to misjudgments.
Analysis:
This interview contains a lot of information.
To clarify, based on information disclosed by media such as China News Weekly, the national expert group consisted of three batches: the first batch went on December 31, led by Xu Jianguo from the Infectious Disease Laboratory of the Chinese CDC, with members including Li Xingwang from Beijing Ditan Hospital and Cao Bin from the China-Japan Friendship Hospital. The second batch went on January 8 and returned on the 16th, with members including Jiang Rongmeng from Ditan Hospital, Gao Zhancheng from Peking University People's Hospital, Feng Zijian, deputy director of the Chinese CDC, and former deputy director Yang Weizhong. The third batch went on January 18, including Gao Fu and Zhong Nanshan.
Wang Guangfa was part of the second batch. The significant report from Caijing magazine on the evening of February 25 also stemmed from an interview with one of the experts from this batch, but it was certainly not Wang Guangfa, as the report mentioned that this expert left at the end of January, while Wang Guangfa returned to Beijing on the 16th.
However, comparing Wang Guangfa's statements with those of this anonymous expert reveals several points of mutual confirmation yet confusion.
First, Wang Guangfa stated that we were not limited to just one report because it was second-hand information, mainly reported by the local CDC and health commission, and we also went down to see patients. In the Caijing magazine interview report, the experts seemed to be led by the local authorities, relying mostly on reports and materials for information. So, what was the detailed situation when they went down to see patients?
Second, Wang Guangfa mentioned that he saw many patients in the fever clinic, and some patients' lung CT scans were very typical of novel coronavirus pneumonia. At that time, the number of such patients crowded in the hospital was not small, but the hospital could still cope. He stated that this was the situation we understood on January 14 and 15. Thus, the expert group suggested that some units should not let patients accumulate in the fever clinic. This statement may indicate that the second batch of experts at least had some awareness of the potential for human-to-human transmission during the later investigation, rather than being completely unaware. What emergency measures did they take?
Sixth Round
Zhong Nanshan Speaks Again
On February 11, Zhong Nanshan stated in a video interview with Reuters that the local government and local health departments did not do their jobs well and should bear some responsibility. Because the pathogen had already been identified, and small-scale clusters of illness had emerged, but ultimately, they did not control it. He also stated that the operation of the CDC should be improved:
“If we had better coordination and cooperation, we could have discovered it earlier and clarified the situation of human-to-human transmission sooner.”
Analysis:
This was Zhong Nanshan's first mention of the issue of responsibility, and it was the only time he made it very clear—local governments discovered it but did not control it, and there was no better collaboration. My understanding is that he was referring to the relationships between the Health Commission, CDC, local governments, grassroots hospitals, and research institutions.
Seventh Round
Gao Fu’s Black and White
Starting in February, criticism of Gao Fu, director of the Chinese CDC, increased significantly. Many self-media outlets regarded him as the main culprit for the failure to control the epidemic, even leading to rumors that he was under investigation.
Opponents argue that the CDC system failed to predict human-to-human transmission in advance and cannot escape blame, while Gao Fu's supporters, represented by Hua Sheng, argue that the CDC has no real power in this system and cannot bear such a heavy burden. Gao Fu himself did work on pathogen identification in the early stages.
Analysis:
Regarding the background and evaluation of the Gao Fu incident, “Media Fried Chicken” has provided a very detailed overview, and you are welcome to check it out here.
Eighth Round
Dispute Over Reporting Standards for Diagnosis
Starting in late January, media reports began to emerge on this issue.
In an interview with frontline ICU doctors in Wuhan, Caixin mentioned several important pieces of information, such as the diagnostic and reporting standards implemented in early January, which included “history of contact with the Huanan Seafood Market.” Many frontline clinicians believed this standard was too strict and would miss patients—because signs of human-to-human transmission had already appeared, and some medical staff had shown symptoms, as well as suspected infections outside the Huanan Seafood Market.
During the dissemination of this information, many believed that the above standard was set by the national expert group. However, starting in mid-February, media outlets, including China Youth Daily, reported further news: the standards implemented locally in Wuhan were inconsistent with those at the provincial and national expert group levels. The core message was—“the national expert group does not bear this blame.”
The national expert group’s standard was that clinical symptoms must be present—fever; normal or decreased white blood cell count in the early stages of the disease; pneumonia imaging features; no improvement with antibacterial treatment. If a patient had a history of exposure to the Huanan Seafood Market, they did not need to meet the “no improvement with antibacterial treatment” condition.
In contrast, the standards implemented in Wuhan, besides being basically consistent with the “national expert group standards” in clinical standards, also required an epidemiological history—having been to or contacted the Huanan Market.
Caixin's report mentioned that a person close to the Hubei provincial expert group said that members of the national expert group were very angry after seeing Wuhan's standards. Later, Wuhan reprinted the standards, but many hospitals still followed the city’s standards.
Analysis:
In fact, if one carefully reads the above media reports, one would not be surprised by the significant report from Caijing magazine on the evening of the 26th, as they all refer to the same issue—the strict control of the reporting standards for epidemic information in Wuhan.
Ninth Round
National Expert Group Members Strike Hard at Hubei Wuhan
On the evening of February 26, many friends have read the significant report from Caijing magazine. This anonymous expert mentioned several important pieces of information, which I will summarize:
The information provided by Wuhan did not include infections among medical personnel. Whenever we heard about infections among medical personnel, we would call to inquire, but the final information we received was not true. We did not see the infection area for medical staff; who knows where they are? In such a large hospital area, how do we find them?
We have always suspected “human-to-human transmission,” but there was simply no evidence. They did not tell us the truth; based on the current real situation, he is lying.
The consensus among our expert group was that suspected and confirmed cases should all be reported. We all agreed before we left. But the next day, the report was not like that. The news that came out reported only 41 cases, merely a batch of people confirmed by laboratory methods. I do not understand the matters behind this.
When we heard about (medical personnel infections), we contacted the hospital because we did not know which specific doctor it was. After contacting them, they did not tell us, did not tell us the truth. We had no way, because it was very clear that it was local management. The instruction we received was that local authorities were primary, and the national expert group was there to help, guide, and assist.
At that time, during our discussions, we asked him to report truthfully. The leader of the Health Commission said on the spot, “Are you suspecting that I am concealing information?” He publicly questioned us, and the experts were all present. Since he said that, what else could we say?
Analysis:
This report from Caijing differs from the previous reports from Caixin and China Youth Daily, as the experts pointed their fingers at the Hubei Provincial Health Commission, because the Health Commission leader mentioned in the remarks was later dismissed. However, from the public reaction, in addition to the criticism of the local government, the public was still very dissatisfied with this group of experts—accusing them of being too bureaucratic in their research style.
Tenth Round
Dispute Over Pathogen Testing in the Health System
On the evening of February 26, just after Caijing published its report, Caixin also released an important report that pointed to another issue—whether the timing of pathogen identification was delayed for certain reasons.
Caixin reported that various pieces of evidence indicated that before the end of December last year, samples from no fewer than nine unexplained pneumonia cases were collected from hospitals in Wuhan, and genetic sequencing showed that the pathogen was a type of SARS-like coronavirus. These test results were gradually fed back to the hospitals and reported to the Health Commission and CDC. However, the Chinese CDC confirmed the pathogen on January 8.
This report disclosed two important pieces of information.
First, a person from a gene sequencing company revealed that on January 1, 2020, he received a call from an official at the Hubei Provincial Health Commission, notifying him that if there were samples of COVID-19 cases in Wuhan, they could no longer be tested; existing case samples must be destroyed, and information about the samples could not be disclosed externally, nor could related papers and data be published.
Second, on January 3, the National Health Commission’s General Office issued a notice titled “Notice on Strengthening the Management of Biological Sample Resources and Related Scientific Research Activities in Major Public Health Emergencies,” which stipulated that without approval, biological samples and related information could not be provided to other institutions and individuals; during the epidemic prevention and control period, information generated from pathogen testing tasks undertaken by various institutions is considered special public resources, and no institution or individual may publish information related to pathogen testing or experimental activities without authorization. Related papers and results must be reviewed and approved by the commissioning department.
Correspondingly, the Beijing News also released a similar report the day before—interviewing Lu Hongzhou, secretary of the Shanghai Public Health Center, who stated that they submitted a report on January 5, stamped with their unit's official seal, indicating their seriousness, but what should not have happened still happened.
In the screenshots circulating online, that report clearly stated the possible pathogen and suggested taking preventive measures in public places, which were reported to the National Health Commission.
Analysis:
In addition to clinical and epidemiological evidence, the isolation and genetic sequencing of the novel virus are actually important factors in assessing the virus's harmfulness. From Caixin's report, it appears that the National Health Commission had already “attached great importance” to the disease at the beginning of this year. However, according to the Infectious Disease Prevention and Control Law, pathogen testing and pathogen identification are the responsibilities of the CDC, and only national and provincial CDCs are qualified to do so. In reality, with the market application of genetic technology, many enterprises and research institutions already possess the above capabilities. Therefore, in the face of a potentially major infectious disease, should they also be excluded? What reasons were there for not adopting their information? If utilized effectively, could more time have been gained? This raises new questions left by media reports.
I believe that after reviewing the above information, most people already have an idea in their minds.
To state a correct but redundant point: the occurrence of a problem must involve personal factors, such as those officials who have already been dismissed and those responsible who have not yet been dismissed; there are also systemic factors, such as the infectious disease prevention system repeatedly mentioned above. As for which factor played a larger role, more information is needed for evaluation.
I believe more information will emerge in the future, and after the epidemic, the national-level investigation will provide the public with a response. One should speak based on evidence, so I will refrain from further speculation here.
References:
- Exclusive | Tracing the Gene Sequencing of the Novel Coronavirus: When Was the Alarm Sounded? Caixin
- News 1+1 | Ma Guoqiang: I now have a sense of guilt and self-blame. CCTV News Client
- Wuhan Mayor Zhou Xianwang Accepts CCTV Exclusive Interview: Not Afraid of Leaving a Bad Name in History. CCTV News
- Ma Guoqiang No Longer Serves as Wuhan Party Secretary, Once Regretted Not Deciding and Taking Action Earlier. Political Knowledge Circle
- Li Bin, Deputy Director of the National Health Commission: Relevant Work Has Been Launched to Prevent Further Spread of the Epidemic. People’s Daily Online - People’s Health Network
- Chief Scientist of the Chinese CDC Zeng Guang: Wuhan’s Slow Action Cannot Exclude Hesitation in Decision-Making. Titanium Media
- Liu Yu Hai. Former Deputy Director of the Chinese CDC Yang Gonghuan: After SARS, the country invested heavily in establishing a direct reporting system for infectious diseases; attention should be paid to how it operated during this epidemic. Economic Observer Network
- Wang Guangfa from the Health Commission Expert Group Has Been Discharged, Answering Our Eight Questions. Ice Point Weekly Yu Qin, Li Shiyun. Questioning the Second Batch of Experts from the Health Commission: Why Wasn’t “Human-to-Human Transmission” Discovered? Public Account “Caijing Efa”
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